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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

INTERPLEADER UNDER WYOMING R.C.P. 22
PURPOSE

Interpleader ,although derived from the old common-law writ of
interpleader,' is an equitable remedy. 2 Basically the purpose of interpleader in equity is to protect a party, not against double liability, but
against double vexation in respect of one liability. Since the purpose is to
protect against vexatious multiple litigation, it is not necessary that the
multiple claims be meritorious; the mere threat of future litigation is
enough.3
Surely a stakeholder, caught in the middle between two competing clamants, cannot in effect decide the merits-of their claims by
the mere physical act of delivering the stake to one of them. If
his position as stakeholder becomes uncomfortable, and claimants
do not take steps to get a judicial solution of the question, the
law has provided him with an interpleader proceeding by which
he can deposit the stake in court
and walk out free of the annoy4
ance of being in the middle.
The stakeholder obviates double expense and the risk of defending two
suits by bringing an interpleader action, and, in addition, the adverse
claimants are thereby compelled to litigate between themselves at their
own expense.
STRICT INTERPLEADER

AND BILLS IN

THE NATURE

OF INTERPLEADER

Originally all actions in interpleader were "strict interpleader" the
inherent requirements 5 of which were: (1) a reasonable apprehension of
double vexation; (2) absence of collusion; 6 and (3) deposit of the res in
court. In addition, the limitations imposed on a bill in strict interpleader
during its evolution were summarized by Pomeroy7 as follows: (1) the
same thing, debt or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties against
whom relief is demanded; (2) all their adverse titles or claims must be
dependent, or be derived from a common source; (3) the person asking
the relief must not have nor claim any interest in the subject matter; (4)
he must have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants,
that is, he must stand perfectly indifferent between them in the position
merely of a stakeholder.8
These rigid limitations necessarily impeded the advantages derived
from the interpleader remedy, and accordingly, equity developed the "bill
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Chaffee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 L.J. 814 (1921); Ilsen and Sardell, Interpleader in the Federal Courts, 35 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (Dec. 1960).
See Note 1, supra.
Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 F. Supp. (1957), citing Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Segarita, 20 F. Supp. 739, 741; Hunter v. Federal Life Ins., 103 F.2d 192
(8th Cir. 19---).
Newark Ins C.o. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 955 (Court of Claims, 1959).
Chaffee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 Yale L.J. 814 (1921).
Failure to attach affidavit of no collusion to the bill was generally ground for
demurrer. Brown v. Marsh, 98 Fla. 253, 123 So. 762 (1929).
4 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, § 1332 5th Ed. (1941).
For a discussion of the four requirements, see Ilsen & Sardell, Interpleader in
the Federal Courts, 35 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 3 (Dec. 1960).

NOTES
in the nature of interpleader" to circumvent the inflexible doctrine of
strict interpleader. The material difference between the true bill of interpleader and bill in nature of interpleader is that plaintiff in the latter
may show that he has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy. 9
The Federal Interpleader Act of 193610 was drafted to include actions
in the nature of interpleader thereby extending broader usage of interpleader in the Federal Courts. The Committee on the Judiciary to whom
the bill was referred wrote: 1
A bill in the nature of interpleader describes a suit filed by a
stakeholder who has some special ground for equitable relief
besides the double vexation. For instance, he is a trustee or
wants cancellation of an instrument for fraud. On the other
hand, double vexation is the only reason for equitable jurisdiction over a bill of interpleader (often called a strict bill) and
the substantive questions at issue are nearly always legal. The
practical difference between the two types of bills is that the long
established equitable principle limiting strict bills are considerably relaxed in cases of bills in the nature of interpleader.
This Act was further supplemented by Federal Rule 22 infra, adopted
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Federal Rule 22 (1)
provides, in addition to the language of the Interpelader Act, . . . It is
not ground for objection to the joinder that the claims of the several
claimants or the titles on which their claims depend to not have a common
origin or are not identical but are adverse to and independent of one
another, or that the Plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part
to any or all of the claimants. .... 12
WYOMING

HISTORY

Prior to the adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure on
December 1, 1957, statutory interpleader 13 was in effect in Wyoming.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

Klaber v. Maryland Casualty Co., 69 F.2d 934, 106 A.L.R. 617 (CC( Neb. 1934).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397 and 2361.
Senate Report No. 558, 74th Congress, 1st session.
Chaffee ,Federal Interpleader since the Act of 1936, 49 Yale L.J. 377, 380, "the
rule makes one important liberalization of relief under the Act of 1936; it allows
relief when the stakeholder is interested in the controversy by disputing his
liability." P. 417, "As already suggested, the adoption of Rule 22 tends to minimize
this distinction (interest in the controversy) and turn all interpleader into bills
in the nature of interpleader.
W.S.C. 1945, § 624. Interpleader. U pon affidavit of a defendant before
answer in an action upon contract, or for the recovery of personal property, that
a third party without collusion with him, has or makes a claim to the subject of
the action, and that he is ready to pay or dispose of the same as the court or
judge may direct, the court or judge may make an order for the safekeeping, or for
the payment or deposit in court of the subject, or the delivery thereof to such
person as the court or the judge may direct and also an order requiring such
third party to appear in a reasonable time and maintain or relinquish his claim
against the defendant; and if such third party, having been served with a copy
of the order, by the sheriff or such person as the court or judge may direct, fail
to appear, the court may declare him barred of all claim in respect to the
subject of the action, against the defendant therein, but if he appear he shall
be allowed to make himself defendant in the action, in lieu of the original
defendant, who shall be discharged from all liability to either of the other parties
in respect to the subject of the action, upon his compliance with the order of
the court for the payment, deposit or delivery thereof.
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The statute was adopted from Ohio 14 in 188614a and provided for defensive
interpleader only. Conditions precedent to invocation of the statutory
remedy were payment of the res into court and an affidavit of no collusion.
If a third party asserting an adverse claim failed to appear after service
of the order, he was barred from asserting any further claim in respect to
the subject of the action. The statute expressly provided for the termination of liability of the stakeholders by allowing the adverse claimant to
make himself defendant in lieu of the original defendant.
The only decision of the Supreme Court of Wyoming based on the
statute was Kinney v. Hynds in 1898.15 In this case, plaintiff brought
action against the First National Bank of Rock Springs on certificates
of deposit issued by the bank which had been lost by Kinney in a faro
game and received by plaintiff through assignment. The bank filed its
affidavit under the statute 16 for an action in the nature of interpleader
setting forth that third party (Kinney) made claim to the certificates
and the money due thereon. The adverse claimant (Kinney) appeared
by order of the court and asserted his claim which plaintiff denied. The
court held that on the issue thus made, the only question was as to who
is entitled to the certificates and that in a judgment for the plaintiff his
recovery was limited to the amount due from the bank on the certificate
only and that he was not entitled to interest.17 The court continued to
say in a dictum:
The proceedings allowed by the code is a substitute for the equitable action of interpleader. The authorities hold that is cumulative and not exclusive. The code proceeding is not authorized
until a suit has been brought against the person holding the
property or fund. The bill of interpleader in equity might be
brought by such person in the absence of any suit against him,
to compel the adverse claimants to interplead and settle the
matter in controversy between themselves. In such a suit, after
the order had been made requiring the claimants to appear and
interplead, proper issues by pleading would be framed, and upon
those issues their respective rights would be determined. The
code contemplates, in its effect and consequences, the same thing
when its provisions in that respect are invoked. No statutory
provision, however, is made as to the course to be pursued in the
framing of the issues subsequent to the order against the third
party, the adverse claimant.
This somewhat ambiguous language of the court in the Kinney case
presumably was meant to explain18 that equitable interpleader might be
14. Pages Ohio Code, § 11265.
14a. Laws 1886, ch. 60, § 69; R.S. 1887, § 2405; R.S. 1899, § 3490; C.S. 1910, § 5603;
R.S. 1931, § 89-524; W.C.S. 1945, § 3-624; Superseded, Rule 87, W.R.C.P. 1957.
15. Kinney v. Hynds, 7 Wyo. 22, 49 Pac. 403 (1898): rehearing denied, 52 Pac. 1081.
16. R.S. 1887, § 2405.
17. On petition for rehearing, denied, 7 Wyo. 22, 51 Pac. 1081 (1898).
18. See syllabus by the Court in 7 Wyo. 22, 24. "The statutory proceeding (R.S. § 2405)
for requiring a claimant to appear and maintain or relinquish his claim against a
defendant is a substitute for the equitable interpleader, but is not exclusive. The
code contemplates in its effects and consequences the same thing as th equitable
interpleader, when its provisions in that respect are invoked." (This syllabus is
omitted in 52 Pac. 1081).

NOTES

maintained by a plaintiff if the case had arisen in this manner, even
though not provided for by statute, and that the code procedure was
subject to cumulation by equitable interpleader principles. This is the
better interpretation of this language and the one which should be followed
in order to allow the equitable principles of interpleader to be used to
supplement the statutory provision. This interpretation, if followed by
the Wyoming Supreme Court under Wyoming Rule 22, would allow the
equitable principles of interpelader to be used in conjunction with
Wyoming Rule 22 in order to gain maximum benefit from the present
rules.
WYOMING

RULE

22

COMPARED

Wyoming RCP 22 is Federal Rule 22 (1). The rule reads as follows:
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as
defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such
that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple
liability. It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the
claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims
depend do not have a common origin or are not identical but are
adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff
avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the
claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain
such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim.
It may be noted that the statutory action in interpleader is not limited
to plaintiffs but may be obtained by a defendant exposed to similar liability
by way of counterclaim or cross-claim and third parties may be impleaded.
The right of a defendant to implead claimants under Rule 22 is
limited to claims whereby he would be exposed to multiple
liability upon the same obligation. This rule does not permit him
to interplead all claimants in an action brought by less than all
merely because the several liabilities have a common origin, if the
interests of the claimants are not adverse to each other and do not
expose the defendant to the danger of double or multiple liability
for the same thing or amounts.19
Other issues may be raised under Wyoming Rule 22 however, by the
deletion of Federal Rule 2 (22), which provides:
The remedy herein provided is in addition to and in no way
supersedes or limits the remedy provided by Title 28, U.S.C.,
secs. 1335,1397 and 2361. Actions under those provisions shall be
conducted in accordance with these rules.
These sections provide generally for payment of the res into court,
termination of the stakeholders liability and issuance of injunction, in
addition to jurisdictional and venue requirements. Thus, in the Federal
Courts, Rule 22 (1) is not exclusive and additional provisions are provided by the Interpleader Act to supplement the rule both of which
basically provide for equitable interpleader action.
19.

United States v. Olson, 5 F.R.D. 513

(No. Calif. 1946).
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The issues raised under Wyoming Rule 22 by this deletion are as
follows:
1. Can the stakeholder pay the disputed res into court?
2. Can a preliminary order be obtained absolving the stakeholder from
further liability?
3. Can the court issue an injunction against the other parties to the
litigation from instigating further action against the stakeholder?
4. Can the litigation be severed into a series of hearings as to the claims
of the several parties?
Consider the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure20 which provide a step
by step codification of the equitable interpleader action:
Rule 35. Right of interpleader - A person who is or may be
exposed to multiple liability or vexatious litigation because of
several claims against him for the same thing may bring an
equitable action of interpleader against all such claimants. Their
claims or titles need not have a common origin, nor be identical,
and may be adverse to, or independent of each other. Such person
may dispute his liability wholly or in part.
Rule 36. By defendants - A defendant to an action which exposed him to similar liability or litigation may obtain such interpleader by counterclaim or cross-petition. Any claimant not already before the court may be brought in to maintain or relinquish his claim to the subject of the action, and on his default
after due service, the court may decree him barred of such claim.
Rule 37. Deposit - discharge. If a party initiating interpleader
admits liability for, or nonownership of, any property or amount
involved, the court may order it deposited in court or otherwise
preserved, or secured by bond. After such deposit the court, on
earing all parties, may absolve the depositer from obligation to
such parties as to the property or amount deposited, before determining the rights of the adverse claimants.
Rule 38. Substitution of claimant. If a defendant seeks an interpleader involving a third person, the latter may appear and make
himself a defendant in lieu of the original defendant, who may
then be discharged in complying with Rule 37.
Rule 39. Injunction. After petition and returns of original
notices are filed in an interpleader, the Court may enjoin all
parties before it from beginning or prosecuting any other suit as
to the subject of the interpleader until its further order.
Rule 40. Costs. Costs may be taxed against the unsuccessful
claimant in favor of the successful claimant and the party initiating the interpleader.
Provision is made both for plaintiff bringing interpleader action and for
defensive interpleader. Deposit in court is expressly provided for as is
discharge of stakeholder and issuance of injunction against all parties
from prosecuting any other action relating to the subject of the interpleader until further order of court. Notice how much simpler is the
action when it is clearly laid out and how much uncertainty is eliminated.
20.

Code of Iowa, Vol. II, p. 2516 (1958).

NoTEs
Compare the Iowa Rules with Wyoming Rule 22. Wyoming Rule 22
must encompass in its scope a function equally as broad as that of the
Iowa Rules and the Federal Rule in conjunction with the Federal Interpleader Act. In order to achieve this, Wyoming Rule 22 must be interpreted in accordance with the equitable principles of interpleader to
allow broad usage of the rule in order to gain its maximum benefit. The
procedure in the following section answers the above issues in the affirmative and attempts to provide the ideal solution to an interpleader action
under Wyoming Rule 22.
MECHANICS

An interpleader action involves two successive litigations, the
first phase of which is between plaintiff and claimants of the fund
involved as to whether claimants shall interplead, and the court
may grant or deny interpleader after hearing on the bill and
answers, while the second phase follows the interpleader decree
and is between adverse claimants on the merits after interplead2
ing their claims to money secured by bond or paid into court. 1
For the purpose of illustration assume the following situation. A and
B are trustees of a trust established in 1930 to pay the income from the
trust res to C, D and E until 1950 when the trust is to be terminated and
the res to be distributed equally among the beneficiaries or their survivors.
At the time for distribution C is alive, in good financial condition and has
no claims against his share of the res. D died in 1959 and left a defective
will. Both the intestate heirs and the legatees under the defective will
claim D's share of the trust res. E is alive and had a judgment rendered
against him in 1949 which remains unpaid. Numerous creditors of E
also claim portions of his share of the trust res. A and B wish to distribute
the fund and be relieved of the trustee duties but fear that if they distribute the proceeds to the wrongful claimant that they may later be held
personally liable to the rightful claimants for breach of fiduciary duty in
distribution of the fund.
This situation could be dealt with ideally under the Wyoming Rules
of Civil Procedure by application of equitable principles of interpleader
to the rules as follows:
1. A and B bring action for interpleader under Rule 22 joining all
parties who assert claims to the fund under Rule 20.22 Joinder will
include C, D's estate and his testate and intestate heirs, and E and all of
his known creditors and asserting claims.
2. A and B obtain leave of court and after notification of all parties
as required, pay the fund into court under Rule 67.
21.

22.

Barron and Holtzoff, Fed. Practice and Procedure, § 555, supp. citing. "Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Radio and Machine Workers of America, 99
F. Supp. 597 (1951), affirmed, 194 F.2d 770; First State Bank of Chariton, Iowa v.
Citizens State Bank of Thedford, Thomas County, Neb., 1950, 10 F.R.D. 424."
The last sentence of Rule 22 provides: "The provisions of this rule supplement
and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20."
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3. A and B move for a temporary restraining order under Rule 65
to enjoin all parties asserting a claim to the fund from bringing further
action or separate action against A and B in regard to the trust res. Such
temporary restraining order may be granted without notice under Rule
65 (b) only upon a showing of irreparable injury to the applicant before
notice can be served and a hearing held thereon. If the restraining order
is granted without notice, a motion for a preliminary injunction shall be
set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence of
all matters except older matters of the same character. By these means,
A and B are protected from further or separate action against them. The
court issues a preliminary injunction at the hearing pending the trial.
4. The court holds a separate trial under Rule 42 (b) as to whether
interpleader will lie. On the facts of this case, defendants will be
required to interplead since the trustees have no interest in the trust res
and the res has been deposited in court. Therefore, the Court enters
judgment in accordance with Rule 54 (b) discharging A and B from all
liability. The court also grants a permanent injunction restraining all
parties to the action from prosecuting any further suit against the trustees.
5. The court now holds separate trials under Rule 42 (b) as to the
rest of the parties. There are no claims against C so the court may
distribute his share of the trust res and enter final judgment in his behalf
under Rule 54 (b). Separate trials then may be conducted on the merits
of the other adverse claims.
If, in the same situation, one or more of the parties had sued A and B
for any part of the res, they could have brought a counterclaim for interpleader by usage of Rule 22 in conjunction with Rule 13. All adverse
claimants could be interpleaded and the same procedure as set out above
applied by the court. Any persons asserting adverse claims, which are not
joined, could intervene under Rule 24 (a) by motion served upon all
parties and thereby protect their interests.
CONCLUSION

Although Wyoming Rule 22 is limited in its language, broad application may be permitted by the use of the equitable principles of interpleader
in conjunction with the rule in order to attain the broad usage of interpleader developed by the courts of equity. In deed the Supreme Court of
Wyoming indicated that statutory interpleader was subject to cumulation
in the Kinney case in 1898. There is no reason to depart from this interpretation under present statute, especially since the rules provide adequate
procedure to be used in such circumstances. Interpleader is not used
often but when appropriate circumstances arise, the remedy should not be
impeded by strict construance of Rule 22.
JEIRRY

A.

YAAP

